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5Abstract
Dominant narratives and theories developed at the turn 
of the 21st century in order to account for civil wars in 
Africa converged around the idea that this upsurge in 
violence was linked to state failure or decay. Violent 
conflict thus came to be seen as the expression of the 
weakness, disintegration and collapse of political ins-
titutions in the post-colonial world, and guerrilla mo-
vements, once viewed as the ideological armed wings 
of Cold War contenders, as roving bandits interested in 
plundering the spoils left by decaying states. Recent 
research has however shown that, against the reduc-
tionism that underlay such accounts, we need to move 
beyond the search for the motives that bring rebels 
and rebel movement to wage war against the establis-
hed order and look into the (micro-)politics of civil war. 
Indeed, civil wars do not simply destroy political orders. 
They contribute to shaping and producing them. Civil 
wars, in other words, are part and parcel of processes 
of state formation. 
 This working paper looks at state formation 
through violent conflict. It focuses on political orders 
put in place by rebel movements, on their strategy to 
legitimise their very existence as movements and their 
claim to power, and on the extent to which they strive 
and manage to institutionalise their military power 
and transform it into political domination. It discusses 
some of the recent literature on the topic and offers 
some avenues of new research on the complex inter-
play between civil wars and state formation. It concen-
trates on the manner in which statehood, understood 
as a historical and constantly changing process of 
institutionalization of power relations, is ‘negotiated’ 
during and after conflict. It is this ‘negotiation’ that 
will allow scholars to better understand what “legiti-
mate institutions” are and how they are shaped by and 
through civil wars.
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The end of the Cold War brought strong hopes that a more peaceful future  
was at hand, but they were rapidly shattered by an upsurge in civil wars and 
apparently meaningless brutality that ravaged many parts of the world in the 
1990s. A number of new narratives and theories of conflict developed towards 
the end of the decade in order to account for these trends. Beyond their 
obvious diversity, these narratives converged around two ideas. First was  
the contention that the increase in civil wars across the globe – particularly 
visible in the 1990s in large parts of Africa and, to a lesser extent, in South 
Asia and Central Europe – was linked to state failure or decay. Violent conflict 
thus came to be seen as the expression of the weakness, disintegration and 
collapse of political institutions in the post-colonial world. Second, guerrilla 
movements, once viewed as the ideological armed wings of Cold War con- 
tenders, were then seen as roving bandits interested in plundering the spoils 
left by decaying states, and their motives as primarily, if not only, economic or 
personal rather than political (Collier & Hoeffler, 1999; Kaldor, 1999; Zartman, 
1995). 
 However, recent research has challenged the reductionism that 
underlay such accounts by looking into the day-to-day politics of civil war, 
thus moving beyond the search for the motives that bring rebels and rebel 
movement to wage war against the established order. Indeed, civil wars, while 
being the cause of immense suffering on the part of civilian populations, do 
not simply destroy political orders; they contribute to shaping and producing 
them (Arjona, 2009; Kalyvas, 2006). Violent conflict is, in other words, part and 
parcel of historical processes of state formation. Thus, if we are to under-
stand how stable political institutions can be built in the aftermath of civil 
war, it is essential to study the institutions that regulate political life during 
conflict. This implies a need to not only look at how (and if) state institutions 
survive once war has broken out, but also to take into account the institutions 
put in place in areas beyond the control of the state.
 War making since the end of the Cold War has not followed a single and 
uniform pattern and the reasons why groups or movements have decided to 
take up arms against the established order are extremely varied. One striking 
commonality across many civil wars, however, is the fact that rebel move-
ments exert control over sometimes vast portions of a country’s territory  
over periods of time that can go from months to decades. Rebel movements 
represent the de facto public authority in the areas under their control and 
they perform acts of governance in the new ‘order’ they establish. Therefore, 
they need to be viewed not simply through the lens of their military strength, 
capacities and activities, but also as political actors exerting power over 
civilian populations. It is imperative to understand the “(micro)politics of 
armed groups” (Schlichte, 2009) or what is increasingly referred to in the 
literature as ‘rebel governance’ (Arjona, 2008; Huang, 2012; Mampilly, 2011). 
This is all the more significant as “even in zones of civil war and widespread 
brawling, most people most of the time are interacting in nonviolent ways” 
(Tilly, 2003, p. 12). In other words, there is (social) life beyond the logics of 
7weapons and war-induced violence, and rulers, be they ‘rebel’ or ‘state repre-
sentatives’, have an important role to play in the regulation of this (social) life.
 However, the relation of rebel movements to civilian order and 
governance is anything but straightforward. Rebels are confronted with a 
dilemma: violence, or rather the ability to turn to warfare, serves as a means 
to address grievances and thus legitimizes their actions. At the same time,  
the use of violence also has delegitimizing effects for rebels. It casts what 
Schlichte calls a “shadow” of suffering and destruction upon the very popu-
lation whose interests they claim to defend. To mitigate these potentially 
delegitimizing effects, they need to “transform the power of violence into 
legitimate domination” (Schlichte, 2009). The “success” of rebels in other 
words depends on their ability to “rule” (Mampilly, 2011) and be granted 
recognition as legitimate rulers by the population under their control. So  
does their ability to transform into political actors after the end of a violent 
conflict (Zeeuw, 2008). Variations in the shape of state institutions in a 
post-war setting depend on the kind of relations that were developed  
between (rebel) rulers and ‘their’ population during war (Huang, 2012).
 This working paper discusses some of the recent literature on the topic 
of governance during civil wars and offers some avenues of new research on 
the complex interplay between civil wars and state formation. It concentrates 
on the manner in which statehood, understood as a historical and constantly 
changing process of institutionalization of power relations, is ‘negotiated’ 
(Hagmann & Péclard, 2010) during and after conflict. It is this ‘negotiation’ that 
will allow scholars to better understand what ‘legitimate institutions’ are and 
how they are shaped by and through civil wars. In order to lay out the backdrop 
of our reflection on the contribution of civil wars to state formation, we first 
review recent debates on the links between statebuliding and peacebuilding 
(chapter 2) as well as on the rise of rebel movements in the post-Cold War 
period (chapter 3). Chapter 4 presents and discusses the different meanings 
and dimensions of ‘rebel governance’, while chapter 5 explains variations 
between rebel movements and their institutionalization. The conclusions  
in chapter 6 lay out some areas for further research. 
Introduction
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Statebuilding and 
Peacebuilding
The links between statebuilding and peacebuilding have attracted renewed 
attention from scholars and policymakers in the last few years.1 The publi-
cation of the 1992 Agenda for Peace by the then UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali was a milestone in the establishment of peacebuilding 
as a methodology to achieve peace. Throughout much of the 1990s, peace-
building was developed as a set of technical solutions giving little attention  
to the historical specificities of each conflict (Paris 2004; Newman, Paris, and 
Richmond 2009). However, this approach offered no reflection on what peace 
and conflict actually meant and instead reproduced a number of “peace 
orthodoxies”, thus contributing to the “bureaucratisation” of peace (Goetschel 
and Hagmann 2009) rather than providing an understanding for the deeply 
political nature of the search for peace and political stability (Chandler 2006; 
Duffield 2001). It treated “peace as an uncontroversial, ahistoric ‘end’, and 
peacebuilding as the means to get there” (Curtis 2012, 9). By promoting 
political and economic liberalisation without taking into account the institu-
tional, political and social context within which these reforms were to take 
place, it also risked leading to further insecurity or even fuelling renewed 
conflict (Paris 2004; Paris and Sisk 2008). This prompted the realisation that 
legitimate and well-functioning institutions are actually crucial to the success 
of peacebuilding and that therefore statebuilding is an essential precondition 
to lasting peace (Rocha Menocal 2011). 
 Yet, definitions of statebuilding and peacebuilding vary greatly, and how 
exactly they relate is still very much an object of debate. As several authors 
point out, the two agendas are potentially contradictory (Rocha Menocal 2011; 
Paris and Sisk 2008; Call and Cousens 2008), and bringing them together is not 
in itself a guarantee of a lasting peace. Besides, the literature (both academic 
and policy-oriented) on the peacebuilding-statebuilding nexus still largely 
relies on a “blank slate” approach (Cramer 2006), that is on the idea that there 
is a clear historical discontinuity between war and peace. Therefore, war as an 
object of research and conceptual reflection has been somewhat neglected in 
the peacebuilding literature. This is in particular the case for research on rebel 
governance, which is still largely absent from current discussions on the role 
of statebuilding and on achieving lasting peace and political stability after 
civil wars. Indeed, critics of the liberal peacebuilding model have so far 
focused on the dangers of a ‘toolkit’ approach to peacebuilding (Newman, 
Paris, and Richmond 2009; Paris 2004), on the neo-imperialism implicit in 
international interventionism (Chandler 2006), on the contradictions between 
statebuilding and peacebuilding (Rocha Menocal 2011) or on the need to take 
into account local actors and values in peacebuilding interventions (Paris and 
Sisk 2008). But so far very little research has been produced on how relations 
and institutions of governance developed under rebel rule fit into long-term 
dynamics of state formation through armed conflict. 
 Moreover, much of the literature on the peacebuilding-statebuilding 
nexus still relies on a normative and prescriptive concept of states as struc-
tures rather than processes, and on the idea that states are the product of 
conscious policies aimed at constructing the institutional infrastructure of 
 1 See for instance (Call 2008a; Rocha Me-
nocal 2011; Paris and Sisk 2008; Roberts 
2008).
9governance rather than historical formations. We argue that states cannot be 
engineered. They are the results of long-lasting historical processes including 
phases of violence. We refer here to the distinction introduced by Berman and 
Lonsdale (1992, 5) between statebuilding, defined as “a conscious effort of 
creating an apparatus of control”, and state formation, defined as “an histo-
rical process whose outcome is a largely unconscious and contradictory 
process of conflicts, negotiations and compromises between diverse groups 
whose self-serving actions and trade-offs constitute the ‘vulgarization’ of 
power”. 
 Accordingly, civil wars need to be seen as part and parcel of historical 
processes of state formation and not, as the expression of states’ inability to 
maintain their monopoly over the use of violence, or as the result of their 
structural “weakness” (Jackson and Rosberg 1982), their “collapse” (Zartman 
1995) and degeneration into nightmarish “shadow” (Reno 2000) or “quasi” 
(Hopkins 2000; Jackson 1990) states, void of popular legitimacy and adminis-
trative capacity.2 While the literature on state failure rests on a very normative 
understanding of states (Hill 2005), taking into account the role of rebel 
governance in state formation allows to look into the “dynamics of states” 
(Migdal and Schlichte 2005), i.e. the way in which states are the constantly 
changing product of “negotiations” (Hagmann and Péclard 2010) between 
state and non-state actors involved in the institutionalisation of power 
relations (Lund 2006) - during and after civil wars. Such a bottom-up approach 
to statehood provides for a better understanding of “legitimate institutions” 
and their formation. 
Statebuilding and Peacebuilding
 2 For critical perspectives on the failed 
states model see Call, 2008; Hagmann 
& Hoehne, 2009; Hill, 2005; Menkhaus, 
2007. 
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Rebels – From Rogues 
to Rulers?
Why do rebels fight? In the last 20 years, especially after the upsurge in civil 
wars that followed the end of the Cold War, the origins of these conflicts have 
been a constant object of debate and controversies. Theories about state 
failure in Africa and other parts of the Global South (Bates, 2008; Milliken & 
Krause, 2002; Rotberg, 2004) have formed the backbone of these debates. 
Civil wars, so the argument goes, were either the expression of states’ inability 
to maintain their monopoly over the use of violence or the result of their 
structural “weakness” (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982), their “collapse” (Zartman, 
1995) and degeneration into nightmarish “shadow” (Reno, 2000) or “quasi” 
(Hopkins, 2000; Jackson, 1990) states, void of popular legitimacy and adminis-
trative capacity.
 The search for the origins of civil wars in the post-Cold War era centred 
on the motivations that led so-called ‘rebels’ to take up arms against the state 
and attempt to subvert the established order by violent means. Until the end 
of the Cold War, it is the logics of the East-West confrontation itself and the 
proxy-wars it generated that were put forward as the main reason for 
protracted fighting in parts of Latin America, Africa and Asia. As a new wave  
of civil wars swept through large parts of Africa, the focus shifted from this 
primarily political perspective to an increasingly ‘de-politicized’ view. Thus,  
US journalist Robert Kaplan suggested in a 1994 article which became widely 
influential in policy and academic circles that: “West Africa [was] becoming 
the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress”, 
concluding in a typically neo-Malthusian fashion that “scarcity, crime, over-
population, tribalism and disease” were “rapidly destroying the social fabric of 
our planet”, making what he called the “coming anarchy” unavoidable (Kaplan, 
1994). In this new context, war, in other words, was no longer ‘politics by other 
means’, but the result of a global disorder revealed by the end of the Cold War. 
 In an academically much more subtle and complex manner, Mary Kaldor 
also argued that the nature of warfare had fundamentally changed in the wake 
of the fall of the Berlin Wall with her distinction between “old” and “new” wars 
(Kaldor, 1999). The distinction rested on three elements: (1) while “old wars” 
were fought with or alongside the people in defence of clearly articulated 
political projects sustained by identifiable ideologies, the “new wars” of the 
1990s were fought against the people; (2) the mobilization of economic 
resources, in particular raw materials, shifted from being a means to an end 
(sustaining the war effort) to an end in itself, epitomized by the figure of the 
warlord (Reno, 1998) motivated by self-interest and personal wealth and 
power accumulation; (3) identity politics, finally, served as a substitute for  
the absence of a political project to mobilize the people (Kaldor, 1999)3 and, 
especially in the wake of the Rwandan genocide, ethnicity was seen to provide 
an explanatory grid for seemingly endless conflict (Gurr and Harff, 1994).
 The abundance of natural resources such as oil or diamonds (Le Billon, 
2001; 2005) as well as the growing scarcity of other natural resources such as 
land and water (Goetschel and Péclard, 2011; Homer-Dixon, 1994) were also 
drawn in as main explanatory factors, as the balance of arguments gradually 
 3 For a critical appraisal of Kaldor’s dis-
tinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ wars, see 
(Kalyvas 2001).
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shifted in favor of an economist approach. In this line of argument, the “greed” 
of rebel leaders in search of economic and political power was far more 
important a variable in explaining rebels’ motives and behavior than political 
“grievances” (Collier, 2000; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). While economic 
approaches rightly pointed to the interconnections between the availability  
of (lootable) natural resources and the occurrence of conflict, the “greed vs. 
grievances” model has been widely criticised for its methodological and 
conceptual flaws (Marchal and Messiant, 2002), for its economic reductionism 
(Cramer, 2006; Duffield, 2001; Francis, 2006; Richards and Helander, 2005) and 
for failing to see rebels and insurgents as anything else than simple “bandits 
devoid of any political agenda” (Bøås and Dunn, 2007, 1).
 It is the very idea of warfare as a political project that was put into 
question in mainstream research on civil wars in the post-Cold War era. 
Debates following 9/11 and the ‘war against terror’ further reinforced such 
perspectives, adding a new political twist as rebels were increasingly labelled 
as ‘terrorists’. As Paul Richards put it, the main problem with such arguments 
is that they “serve to set up a dichotomy between war as some kind of inhe- 
rent ‘bad’ (the world ruled by instincts and base desire), and peace as an ideal 
‘good’ (the world ruled by principle and law). With this kind of approach war 
itself becomes the enemy - indeed, the common enemy of human kind” 
(Richards and Helander 2005: 3). Moreover, war is taken out of its social 
context, away from the historical, cultural, religious, and political element 
that, if properly analyzed, would in fact contribute to giving it meaning. “War  
is foregrounded as a ‘thing in itself’ and not […] one social project among many 
competing social projects” (ibid.). Rather than opposing war and peace, then, 
it is more fruitful, sociologically speaking, to focus on the continuities from 
the one to the other in order to pay due attention to the governance patterns 
that emerge “between war and peace” (Arnaut and Højbjerg, 2008), or, to use 
Marielle Debos’ phrase, at “the government of the inter-war” (Debos, 2013). 
 In recent years, the debate on civil wars has moved from the quest for 
rebels’ motives and for the origins of violence to a thorough analysis of the 
political dimensions of life during civil war (Arnaut & Højbjerg, 2008). In 
particular, this literature discusses the way in which rebels organize and 
regulate social life in the territories that come under their control in the  
course of conflict and how this relates to state formation processes. Behind 
this move toward studying rebels as ‘rulers’ is a reflection about the use of 
coercion and the social construction of legitimacy. Mampilly argues that the 
most important challenge for insurgency is how to resist the “brutal efficiency 
of coercive tools if they hope to mobilize civilians behind their cause” 
(Mampilly, 2011: 50; Schlichte, 2009).
 With this new body of literature, we now have a far better understanding 
of the organisational structures of (rebel) armed groups (Weinstein, 2007), of 
the emergence of alternative forms of social order in war-affected zones 
(Arjona, 2009; Kasfir, 2005; Mampilly, 2011) and the conditions of collective 
action (Wood, 2003), as well as of the relationships between territorial control 
Rebels – From Rogues to Rulers?
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and the use of violence (Kalyvas, 2006). Taken together, and beyond their 
obvious diversity, these studies build a new, ‘re-politicised’ narrative of 
state-society relations in rebel-held territories. They also offer new interroga-
tions on the continuities between war and peace (Manning, 2007; Müller, 2012; 
Zeeuw, 2008) and thereby contribute to a better understanding of state-
building in post-conflict contexts, since “variation in post-war regimes has 
wartime origins” (Huang, 2012: 3).
 But what exactly is ‘rebel governance’? Do all rebel groups establish 
sophisticated institutions of social and political regulation? If not, how can we 
account for the differences between various rebel movements? What is rebels’ 
claim to legitimacy built on? What kind of correlation is there between rebel 
governance and their post-war (in)stability? And how does rebel governance 
relate to long-term processes of state formation through war? This working 
paper discusses some of the theoretical dimensions of rebel governance while 
exploring in what ways and to what extent rebel groups establish institutions 
of social and political regulation. After a brief discussion of what defines rebel 
governance, the next section turns to the importance of resources in shaping 
relations between rebel movements and civilians, as well as to the link 
between violence and territorial control. 
Rebels – From Rogues to Rulers?
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4
Inside Rebel Governance
Rebel organizations can be defined as groups whose members are “engaged in 
protracted violence with the intention of gaining undisputed political control 
over all or a portion of a pre-existing state’s territory” (Kasfir, 2008: 4). Among 
the definitions of rebel governance, that of Huang (2012: 8): “a political stra- 
tegy of rebellion in which rebels forge and manage relations with civilians 
– across civil wars”, is well suited to the purpose of this paper, due to its 
encompassing character and its emphasis on the political dimension. Kasfir 
(2002: 4) applies the term governance to “the range of possibilities for organi-
zation, authority, and responsiveness created between guerrillas and civi-
lians”, and Mampilly (2011: 4) adds “a ‘governance system’ refers not only the 
structures that provide certain public goods but also the practices of rule 
insurgents adopt”. While for some authors governance involves little or no  
use of violence against civilians, for others governance can only coexist with 
violence.
 A variety of criteria must be met in order for rebel governance to occur. 
According to Kasfir (2008: 4) guerrilla governments can only exist if the rebel 
organization gains control over a territory that contains civilians, and decides 
to create or encourage civilian structures. Therefore, to engage in guerrilla 
governance, i) a rebel organization must gain control within the state against 
which it is rebelling; ii) civilians must reside in that area; iii) there must be at 
least initial violence if not continuing violence; iv) the guerrilla must be free 
from external control (Kasfir, 2008: 4-5). This makes explicit that not all rebel 
organizations engage in governance-like practices. Within those groups that 
do implement structures, there are wide variations in the extent to which each 
one engages in wartime ‘state-building’, with a political objective. The pro- 
vision of security to the civilian population the “establishment of a police 
force followed by the development of a broader legal mechanism, either 
informal or formal, is the highest priority for any leadership and is often the 
key determinant as to whether the rebel group is able to make the transition 
from a roving insurgency to a stationary one” (Mampilly, 2011: 63). But insur-
gents can also respond to other demands and expectations from civilian 
population such as providing education and health services, establishing  
a system of food production and distribution, allocating land or providing 
shelter, as well as controlling certain borders and operating a parallel system 
of cross-border trade control (Raeymaekers, 2011). 
 Following Mampilly (2011: 17), we can sum up the main conditions for 
effective rebel governance as follows: i) a force capable of policing the popu-
lation; ii) dispute resolution mechanism; iii) capacity to provide other public 
goods beyond security; iv) feedback mechanisms to foster civilian partici-
pation in governmental issues. There are also instrumental assertions of 
power such as norms, values, practices, beliefs, which are all key to the 
construction of sovereignty. Rebels sometimes go to great lengths to project 
their symbolic power: official flags and mottos, printing of a national currency 
(SPLM in Sudan), national anthems. There are however great variations 
between insurgent groups:  “rebel leaders may adopt a variety of approaches 
in their engagement with civilians, ranging from those that choose to issue 
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directives unilaterally – adopting autocratic practices in their interactions 
with civilians – to those that seek to provide civilians and other actors an 
opportunity to participate in the decision making process” (ibid.).
4.1  Organizational structure and resources
Weinstein (2007) was one of the first authors to look into the political organi-
zation of rebel groups, analyzing how resource endowment (natural resources, 
external assistance, protection or ransom payments) shapes civilian 
governance. Drawing primarily on case studies of wars in Uganda, Mozam-
bique, and Peru, he distinguishes between ‘resource-rich’ insurgents who are 
able to have access to resources immediately and who can rapidly finance 
themselves and pay their recruits (opportunistic groups), and ‘resource-poor’ 
insurgents who do not have immediate access to such wealth, leading them  
to cultivate ‘social endowments’, ethnic, religious or ideological identities,  
and mobilize interpersonal networks (activist groups) (Ibid: 47-49). In turn, this 
shapes the guerrilla’s organization: resource-rich leaders will have short-term 
horizons, undisciplined recruits and more violent, abusive relations with 
civilians (e.g. in the vocabulary of Collier of greed over grievance); resource-
poor leaders will build a closer, more political relationship with their recruits 
and the civilian population in their area, more easily gain their trust, and are 
more likely to ask civilians to participate in the organization (e.g. grievance 
over greed). In short, “differences in how rebel groups employ violence are  
a consequence of initial conditions that leaders confront” (Ibid: 7).
 While Weinstein’s analysis had the merit to take the discussion on the 
links between natural resources and conflict beyond the simplifications of  
the greed vs. grievances model, it however raises questions that are left 
unaddressed and that could be refined. For example, by focusing on eco- 
nomics or rational choice arguments, he dismisses the ideological and social 
dimensions of the insurgencies. Kasfir argues on his part that “social endow-
ments, that is, norms and networks, are always available in resource-rich 
countries and leaders may depend on them to meet their objectives even when 
they have easy access to material rewards” (2008: 19). Mampilly adds that the 
distinction between opportunistic and activist insurgencies “does not hold” as 
indeed “rebellions have a wide variety of viable funding sources and demon-
strate considerable dexterity in switching between available options. […] 
Trying to determine the relative influence of a particular funding source is also 
challenging because of the difficulty of gathering hard data on the real 
sources of rebel finance” (2011: 14-15). Additionally, the ‘fast-mover’ argument 
which states that economic incentives are quicker to mobilize individuals than 
ideological and ethnic identities, is contested.
 Further, Weinstein does not address the effect of participation on the 
social interactions between recruits: “once particular insurgencies attract 
distinct types of recruits, the process of insurgent collective action seems  
to have little effect” (Tarrow 2007: 591). Nor does he take into account the 
Inside Rebel Governance
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response of the civilian population, who can for example respond to violence 
by creating their own militias. Huang (2012: 85) also states that “across all  
civil wars extensive rebel state-building has been more the exception than  
the norm”. Likewise, ‘rebel governments’, as defined by Weinstein, have 
seldom been established. Most rebels either do not seek, or fail to achieve, 
elaborate state-building, and yet manage to wage war and generate significant 
casualties. 
4.2  Degrees of territorial control and violence
In the same way that Weinstein’s study goes beyond the greed and grievance 
debate by differentiating between different insurgent organizations, Kalyvas 
analyzes the degree of rebel control over territory and the manner in which 
this impacts on their use of violence.
 The question of violence is of central concern when studying civil wars, 
and Kalyvas (2006) proposes an explanation as to its variation. He differen-
tiates civil war and civil war violence by distinguishing “between violence as 
an outcome and violence as a process” (Ibid: 21). This is different from most 
studies that view violence as an outcome of civil war. Indeed, Kalyvas con- 
siders violence to be a dependent variable. He argues that the degree of 
territorial control of insurgencies determines the nature of their relations  
with civilians, and distinguishes between: total incumbent control, dominant 
incumbent control, contested control, dominant insurgent control and total 
insurgent control. Kalyvas argues that rebel organizations have but two 
options when it comes to violence: selective violence and indiscriminate 
violence, the latter being “a way to come to grips with the identification 
problem” (allegiances), meaning that it will take place “where and when 
resources and information are low” (Ibid: 147), in order to shape civilian 
behavior “indirectly through association” (Ibid: 150). Accordingly, indiscrim-
inate violence cannot induce obedience and may be counterproductive, while 
selective violence may create an awareness of political actors sanctioning 
behavior.
 Wood also focuses on violence in her research on insurgencies: her first 
book, Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa 
and El Salvador (2000) shows how democratic transitions are driven by 
collective action from below, and her second, Insurgent Collective Action a 
nd Civil War in El Salvador (2003) explains how such action continued in the 
face of state violence. In El Salvador, she realized that no classic economic or 
social measures could have foreseen which areas supported guerrillas, which 
remained neutral, and which supported the government. She argues, “an 
emergent insurgent political culture was key to the generation and sustaining 
of the insurgency despite its high costs” (Ibid: 225). In a contested territory, 
the state may choose to appeal to the population by adopting persuasive 
techniques, but in areas of insurgent control the sovereign power often 
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chooses to engage with civilians through violence. Wood shows that the 
repression of legitimate grievances leads civilians to support insurgencies,  
in particular when violence is used indiscriminately.
 The scholars we have focused on in this section face a common 
problem, as do most scholars in the post-Collier literature: they give a central 
place to financial strategies and violence, and “tend to  distill the nature of a 
highly complex political organization into its most gasp inducing components, 
lending credence to those who view all non-state armed groups as analogous 
to criminal  organizations […] recruitment and violence do not provide much 
insight into the broader set of interactions that violent organizations engage  
in with local communities” (Mampilly, 2011: 6). They additionally do not 
account for the variations that exist between insurgencies, take a top down 
approach and give the impression that rebellions are unable to depart from 
the path they started on. Other scholars however have chosen to emphasize 
precisely these discrepancies and attempt to explain why the trajectories of 
armed groups are so different. It is to this body of work that this paper now 
turns.
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Accounting for Variations
in Rebel Governance
Scholars have explained the variation between the different systems of rebel 
organizations and trajectories according to different variables. Some use 
dichotomies: Olson (1993) distinguishes between roving vs. stationary bandits, 
and Metelits (2009) between the provision of public goods by rebels and 
coercion. Others take into account more than two dimensions. For example, 
Kasfir (2005) writes about the degree to which rebels support civilian partici-
pation, what forms of civilian administration they put in place and their use of 
civilians to get high value goods or services, whilst Mampilly (2011) identifies 
different levels of effective civil administration structures put in place by 
rebel organizations (ranging from low to moderate to high), based on three 
case studies: the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka (highly 
effective), the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Sudan 
(partially effective) and the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie 
(RCD) in the Democratic Republic of Congo  (ineffective). For Mampilly 
“variation in civilian governance provision by insurgents emerges from a 
combination of the initial preferences of rebel leaders and the interaction  
of insurgent organizations with a variety of other social and political actors 
active during the conflict itself. As a result, governance is, by nature, an 
evolutionary process in which the outcome cannot be predicted by a single 
variable” (2011: 15-16).
 Some researchers have also developed different typologies of rebel 
organizations: Clapham (1998) develops four broad categories: liberation 
insurgencies, separatist insurgencies, reform insurgencies and warlord 
insurgencies. Weinstein (2007) identifies four types of rebel groups, differen-
tiated according to how democratic their government is in terms of power-
sharing and inclusiveness: unilateral military and participatory, unilateral 
military and non-participatory, joint military-civilian and non-participatory 
and joint military-civilian and participatory. Arjona (2009) focuses on the 
notion of social order and bases this on two dimensions: whether an under-
lying contract between the group and the population exists, and if it does, 
what the level of the insurgent’s intervention in civilian affairs is. In doing so 
she identifies three types: domination (no social contract exists), surveillance 
(the contract exists but the group intervenes little) and “rebelocracy” (the 
contract exists and the rebel group’s intervention is broad). The following 
subsections will develop the analysis and the limits of several of these 
theories in more detail.
5.1  Rebels as state builders?
Among the set of studies that have taken a more politically oriented approach, 
Olson (1993) is one of the pioneers who associates rebel organizations with 
embryonic states. Even though his study highlights the economic rewards 
(taxation systems) which rebels gain by deciding to move from being ‘roving 
bandits’ to ‘stationary bandits’, he also draws an interesting parallel with 
state formation. According to this perspective, only by replacing some of the 
functions of the nation-state will an insurgency be able to obtain support for 
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its political authority, hence achieving one form of legitimacy. Despite the 
relationship between rebels and civilians certainly extending beyond mere 
economic needs (as discussed above), and even though Olson’s analysis was 
shaped in a different landscape than that of the current more globalized era, 
his concept of a stationary bandit is taken as a starting point to define rebel 
governance by almost all scholars.
 Several authors indeed draw parallels between the performance and 
governmental-like functions provided by rebel groups and the origin of the 
bureaucratic state (Kasfir, 2002; Tull, 2005; Kingston and Spears, 2004):  
“using a related politico-economic logic but positing it instead as driving a 
telos in the process of consecration are those that adapt the state-formation 
models of Charles Tilly (1990) and Mancur Olson (1993) to contemporary 
violent actors” (Mampilly, 2011: 31). These authors argue that rebel groups 
replicate steps that lead to the rise of nation states. This model is based  
on the idea that ‘state-building rebels’ become wartime ‘democrats’ for 
economic reasons, and that by the time the war has ended, rebels have 
developed representative institutions, created a support-base and gained 
legitimacy among the population living in the territory they control. This is a 
“banditry model of state formation” (Mampilly, 2011: 31). Kingston and Spears 
(2004) even use the terminology of “states within states”, while others speak 
of “quasi states” (despite lacking juridical recognition, these systems are in 
fact a replica of the sovereign state).
 The theory that rebel groups embark on a trajectory towards statehood 
however has its limits. This approach has contributed to creating a rather 
state-centric analysis, where the idea of the ‘state’ is the model and basis 
with which to compare rebel organizational structures; thereby initiating a 
tendency to view insurgents as types of state-builders. This often leads to  
an oversimplified and normative dichotomy between those rebel organizations 
associated with embryonic states structures and rebel organizations viewed 
as warlords who do not engage in state building. Additionally, scholars adop- 
ting such a view often see a state where it does not exist: as Mampilly percep-
tively notes, “conflating rebel governance with state order forces analysts  
to awkwardly transpose the state-formation framework onto an actor that 
actively resists the state’s attempts to project order within its ascribed 
territory […] What is really an issue with rebel governance is not state for- 
mation but rather the formation of a political order outside and against the 
state” (2011: 36). Thus, one cannot apply a predefined model of state for- 
mation onto a dynamic contemporary process of insurgent governance (2011: 
27). Mampilly claims that it is more interesting to examine the limits of this 
analogy and prefers to view rebels as “counter-state sovereigns”.
5.2  From rebel groups to political parties?
If one assumes that rebel governance shapes social processes such as 
activism and political organization (Wood 2003), it can also be expected that 
rebels shape post-war dynamics. Different types of political parties take 
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shape in contexts of transition from war to peace, including parties coming 
from former armed movements (e.g. Farabundo Martí National Liberation 
Front in El Salvador, RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance) in Mozam-
bique, the Rwandan Patriotic Front or Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/
Army in South Sudan). The way in which former armed actors participate in 
post conflict governance is actually seen as a key factor in the success or 
failure of peace building. Most of the literature on peacekeeping and post-
conflict reconstruction has studied governance by former rebel groups once 
they have achieved power, but has not taken into account the relevance of 
studying rebel groups during civil war.
 This is a further reason why studying governance processes and 
patterns during civil wars is so important. Indeed, whether or not former 
armed rebel movements are successful in their transition to legitimate 
political parties in a post-civil war context is strongly linked to their ability  
to construct their legitimacy during conflict. Thus, Manning (2007), in her 
analysis of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Mozambique, focuses on the 
interaction between the institutional context, the exact nature of the conflict 
and what internal organizational dynamics are formed during the war. For her, 
the existing difficulties and challenges to intra-elite relations as well as the 
strategies developed to obtain a voter base influence how institutions affect 
party behavior and, ultimately, whether parties choose to adapt or subvert  
the rule of democracy. In a similar vein, de Zeeuw (2008) in his research argues 
that a successful conversion from rebel group to party depends on the moti- 
vation, structure and leadership of a rebel movement, but can also be influ-
enced by other factors such as the manner in which the conflict was settled 
(i.e. negotiations or military victory), and the local political and security 
context. He strives to demonstrate that there is not only one way in which 
such a transition can take place, but rather to illustrate that it is a complex 
process with various dimensions. Müller (2012) focuses on the continuity 
between core features of rebel governments during the war and their politics 
in resulting states, and the importance of war credentials for legitimizing 
state ownership. Finally, Huang (2012) focuses on two aspects of rebels’ 
wartime behavior vis-à-vis civilians: the source of rebel income and the extent 
to which rebel groups engage in wartime state-building, in order to explain the 
variation of the post-civil war regime outcomes.
 As shown by Kasfir (2005), civilians develop their own perception of 
social order, institutions and the state. His conception of the development of 
civilian political awareness has been integrated into theories explaining how 
rebel groups transform into political parties. Huang for example makes a 
“civilian state-building hypothesis”: “when rebels extract widely from civi-
lians for wartime resources, a significant social change takes place: civilians 
become politically mobilized. Participation in rebellion, whether voluntary  
or coerced, provides civilians with new information on their political rights,  
on the ways the state is purportedly impinging those rights, and on the avail-
ability of alternatives to the status quo; it also makes those alternatives 
appear to be within reach, creating expectations of radical breaks with the 
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autocratic past in a new postwar regime” (Huang, 2012: 9). She argues that 
those organizations which have popular support and which have engaged in 
state building are more likely to transform into legitimate popular parties in 
the aftermath of civil war. Indeed, the existence of rebel governance in the 
course of the civil war has an impact on their legitimacy at the local level, and 
the programs they can develop in order to aid reconstruction, reconciliation 
and reintegration. The establishment of governance during war also has an 
impact on the experience, capacity and wish of insurgents to engage in 
politics after the end of the war.
 The internal structure of rebel movements also plays a role, and there  
is a debate regarding whether the organization of a former insurgency, or  
its leadership, determines if and how the group becomes a political party. 
Manning (2007) shows the relevance of relations between the institutional 
context and internal organizational dynamics within rebel groups. According 
to her the issue of securing loyalty among civilians has an influence on how the 
institutional context affects party behavior, and therefore if parties choose to 
adapt or subvert the democratic rules of the game. De Zeeuw (2008) adds that 
different factors can facilitate or hinder political change: motivation and 
structured leadership are key. He distinguishes between rebel groups orga-
nized in autonomous cell structures, which will have more difficulty to turn 
into political parties after war, rebel groups with a centralized and person-
alized decision making methods, which are less successful in their postwar 
transformation, and groups with decentralized, open and collective decision 
making processes, those best fit to transforming into political parties. 
However, the type of conflict settlement, the domestic and regional political 
and security context, as well as the role played by international actors are 
equally important.
5.3  Beyond formal structures: the relationship 
 with civilians
Kasfir critiques Olson’s metaphor as “beguiling but an overgeneralization: all 
insurgents who hold territory are “stationary bandits,” but not all of them form 
civilian governments” (Kasfir, 2008: 3), but nevertheless bases his definition 
on Olson’s insights about territoriality. Kasfir tries to understand why organi-
zations vary so greatly in their relations with civilians living in territories that 
they control. He believes that insurgents choose to form civilian governments 
only when they believe it will help them win. Once they make their commitment 
however, other factors such as civilian response come into play. Taking the 
case of the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda to study its relationship 
with the civilian population strategy, Kasfir concludes that coercion is a 
central tool for insurgents when they aim to take control of a territory, but 
once the rebel group gains control, an overreliance on coercive means will be 
detrimental and will limit its ability to obtain popular support (Kasfir, 2005). 
While several scholars argue that many civilians give voluntarily to rebels, he 
infers that civilian motivations for aiding the rebels are mixed: “most peasants 
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probably felt an underlying sense of coercion, even if they were not open about 
it”, since all of their activity was under surveillance by the NRA (2005: 285).
 Mampilly also believes that “the most important challenge for insur-
gency is how to resist the brutal efficiency of coercive tools if they hope to 
mobilize civilians behind their cause” (2011:50). Schlichte’s (2009) central 
argument is that armed groups need to gain legitimacy in order to turn the 
power of violence into legitimate rule. While many analyzes focusing on the 
violence of rebel groups have reduced a highly complex political organization 
to its criminal components, Schlichte looks at the broader set of interactions 
that insurgents engage in with local communities. He argues that rebel 
organizations are constantly negotiating the contradictions between their 
social legitimacy and the violence they use. Successful groups are those 
which are capable of overcoming the “shadow of violence”, even becoming 
state founders, more or less formally: “converting military power into rule is 
their ultimate task. The success of armed groups in these attempts differs 
enormously” (2009: 14).
 Rebel organizations must therefore seek support: “persuad[ing] local 
inhabitants to give support voluntarily means that guerrillas must either adapt 
their message to local beliefs, or educate civilians to change their prefer-
ences” (Kasfir, 2005: 281). In order to do so they use certain techniques and 
strategies such as warrior habitus, collective interpretations of violence, and 
individual experiences of violence. Their rhetoric using heroic tales, symbols, 
speeches, and sophisticated doctrines are useful for convincing people of the 
legitimacy of violence (Schlichte, 2009: 65). The insurgents must also adapt to 
the civilian response “an ideology may provide direction, but its imperatives 
often have to be modified as guerrillas learn how to stay alive and how to use 
their immediate environment” (Kasfir, 2005: 34). Rebels must adapt to the 
population and need to seek their support. Civilians are rarely only victims  
in war zones, they are neither passive nor invisible and can sometimes even 
manipulate rebel governance. Discontented civilians can pose a number of 
challenges to the rebel command: noncompliance with insurgent directives, 
autonomous CSOs expressing discontent, covert or overt collaboration with 
the state, sabotage actions and even formation of local militias (Mampilly 
2011: 67). Just like sovereign governments, rebels must negotiate with civi-
lians in exchange for their loyalty and in order to ‘appear’ legitimate.
 The struggle for legitimacy of rebel rulers in the eyes of the civilian 
population does not only play out at the local level. Rebel movements increas-
ingly seek support, both symbolic and material, for their cause at the interna-
tional level. Through such dynamics of “extraversion” (Bayart, 1999), the local 
and international dimensions of rebel rule are interlinked, as the case of 
Darfur paradigmatically shows (Jumbert and Lanz, 2013). As Schlichte notes, 
“on the level of discourses, the speeches and writings of insurgents have been 
part of one global discursive field in which armed groups themselves not only 
participated, but they also shaped self-perceptions and reactions by various 
international actors, ranging from single governments to churches, NGOs, and 
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major international institutions like the UN” (2009: 197). Some armed groups 
gain, he adds, “such a high degree of international legitimacy that their 
struggle to turn firepower into political domination cannot be blocked from 
outside” (Ibid.).
 In other words, rebels, like any social or political group, and regardless 
of their degree of territorial control in the areas they ‘govern’, do not operate  
in a social and political vacuum. They are entangled in complex “figurations” 
of power, following Schlichte’s use of the concept developed by Norbert Elias, 
that alternatively restrict, support or shape their ability to ‘rule’, and they 
cannot simply impose their will or that of their movement. In particular, they 
have to take into account demands from three sectors: from below (i.e. from 
civilian populations in the areas under their control); from within (i.e. they are 
always confronted with risks of rebellions from within the movement itself); 
from above (i.e. from the international community). 
 In other words, the key variable in understanding both the dynamics of 
rebel governance and the variations between the forms it may take as well as 
its extent is legitimacy, understood not as a norm but as “an empirical phe- 
nomenon” depending on “people’s beliefs, perceptions and expectations”, a 
“particular quality that is conferred upon a social or political entity by those 
who are subject to it or part of it, thus granting it authority” (Bellina et al., 
2009). Indeed, the exercise of power by force and violence alone is not suffi-
cient for the establishment of stable political orders. As Max Weber argued, 
the passage from raw power (Macht) to domination (Herrschaft) — a type of 
authority that is based on obedience and recognition rather than sheer 
physical force — is a central element in state formation processes (Weber, 
1947). Research on authoritarian rule and “the rise of semi-authoritarianism” 
(Ottaway 2003) in the post-Cold War era has thus shown that the durability of 
such regimes depends not only on their repressive capacity, but also on other 
elements such as the cohesiveness of party structures (Levitsky and Way 
2010) or on their ability to build broad elite coalitions to sustain state power 
(Slater 2010). Besides, as Béatrice Hibou argues, the “force of obedience” 
(2011) rests on the way in which authoritarian regimes manage to respond to 
people’s aspiration to a “normal life” in the context of recurrent crises and the 
threat of political and military repression. 
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Conclusions
Beyond the obvious diversity of research on civil wars and ongoing debates, 
there seems to be a consensus among scholars that considering rebel 
movements in the post-Cold War era as roving bandits only motivated by their 
greed for economic and political power has proven to be simplistic and reduc-
tionist. Indeed, all attempts at proposing single-cause explanations for the 
origins, development, success and failure of rebel movements, be it greed, 
ethnicity, regional disparities, etc., fall short of accounting for the complexity 
of armed groups as “figurations” (Schlichte, 2009, after Norbert Elias). 
Studying political and social life during conflict is a way of avoiding the trap  
of reductionism, and this is where the contribution of the emerging literature 
on rebel governance is most important. However, much as is it misleading to 
de-politicize the motivations and actions of rebel movements, it would be 
equally erroneous to automatically consider all of them as ‘natural-born’ 
civilian rulers. The degree to which rebels engage in the development of a 
system of civilian rule and a bureaucratic apparatus vary greatly, as does their 
political legitimacy among the populations they control. Therefore, we need to 
explore the conditions under which military control by rebels translates (or 
does not translate) into civilian institutions meant to regulate the daily 
business of social and political life in times of war. 
 Rebels do not rule by force only, and they do not operate in a social and 
political vacuum. Although force and the potential use of violence obviously 
play an important role in rebels’ efforts to control people and territory, they 
cannot establish sustainable rule through violence and threat alone. In rebel 
territories, as in any polity, however authoritarian, domination rests on a 
complex combination of raw power and popular consent (Hibou, 2011) and 
“rebel leaders must negotiate with civilians in exchange for their loyalty -  
no easy task as civilian demands frequently involve a variety of different and 
often competing perspectives” (Mampilly, 2011, p. 9). In other words, we need 
to understand how, in areas under rebel control, popular consent is manufac-
tured through the day-to-day of political interactions between rebels, civilian 
populations under their control, and local, pre-existing forms and institutions 
of civilian rule, including remnants of the central state’s administration. 
Mampilly (2011) has convincingly argued that rebel governance tends to be 
more efficient in areas where the state – and other institutions of social 
regulations such as traditional religious authorities – were stronger and more 
present prior to the civil war. While there is no direct causality link between 
the two, this shows how important it is to study the relations between rebel 
rulers and other forms of public authority. Understanding the historical 
processes of the institutionalization of political rule is crucial here, both from 
a very local perspective, as these processes are strongly idiosyncratic, and in 
view of the dynamics of extraversion (Bayart, 1999) at play in the polity in 
question.
 Research on rebel governance has shown quite convincingly that the 
ability of rebel movements to transform in to political parties in the post-
conflict era depends to a large degree on their success in overcoming the 
“shadow of violence” (Schlichte, 2009) that their very existence as armed 
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movements generates by constructing their own legitimacy with regard to 
civilian population and establishing institutions of civilian rule. However, this 
question has thus far been addressed mostly around the rebel movements 
themselves: can they transform into state-builders, both during and especially 
after the end of a violent conflict? This is of course central, and the transition 
from rebel movements to political parties is a key element of a sustainable 
transition from war to peace. However, there is a need to broaden the scope  
of reflection to the overall claims and grievances that rebels mobilize in order 
to legitimize their actions. 
 In other words, we need to look at how the symbolic and material 
aspects of rebel rule ‘survive’ the end of hostilities, especially in formerly 
rebel-held territories, and how this impacts long-term state formation pro- 
cesses. This is important at two levels. First, while a focus on rebel gover- 
nance allows for a more in-depth and complex understanding of the political 
processes at play during violent conflict, the cultures of power developed in 
rebel held territories, and especially the role of violence as a repertoire of rule, 
need to be taken into consideration, not only during civil wars, but beyond, as 
countries engage on the bumpy road following the end of open military hostil-
ities. For instance, the return to violent fighting in South Sudan in December 
2013, two years after the country’s hard-won independence and as a conse-
quence of split with the SPLM/A can be linked to the resilience of a culture  
of violence, whereby fighting is the privileged mode of ‘conflict resolution’  
(de Vries and Justin, 2014). 
 Secondly, as mentioned throughout this paper, narratives of economic, 
social, political and cultural marginalization are often key in rebels’ strategies 
of legitimation and in establishing rebel rule. The ‘manufacture of consent’  
by rebels is thus based on the mobilization of grievances against the state  
and the promises by rebels to address them. Studying these narratives and 
analyzing how and to what extent they continue to shape the post-war period 
both in terms of discourse and in terms of concrete policies, or how they 
continue to shape the “images” and “practices” of the state (Migdal and 
Schlichte, 2005), is key to understanding the relations between war and  
state formation. 
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